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Preface 
The Soviet Union is presently in the throes of internal collapse. The 
question is no longer if the USSR will survive, but how and when it 
will break up. As part of this development Soviet military doctrine 
has undergone a profound change. However in contrast to the 
accelerating domestic political and economic chaos, the transfor-
mation of the Soviet military has hitherto remained relatively 
orderly. The implementation of the military reforms remains under 
the tight control of the General Staff, acting on the basis of its own 
systematic analyses of the evolving military situation and the views 
and requirements of the political leadership. While the outcome of 
these deliberations is still uncertain it is clear that the Soviet military 
will be changing profoundly in the 1990's. This will in turn have 
major repercussions in international affairs. 
In this study James McConnell outlines the rationale and driving 
forces behind the ongoing changes in Soviet military doctrine, 
providing us with a glimpse of the likely direction which future 
Soviet military policy will take. The first chapter presents the basic 
political and economic driving forces behind the changes in the 
Soviet Union, focussing on their impact on Soviet military policy. 
His main conclusion is that Moscow - in an obviously major break 
with former practice - is preparing to abandon the military 
competition with the west on the Eurostrategic, tactical-nuclear and 
conventional level. Instead they will channel the bulk of their 
military efforts in the coming years on the two areas which they see 
as decisive: strategic nuclear forces and the militarization of space. 
Using Soviet sources McConnell traces the rationale behind the 
strategic retreat on the theatre level and the shift of emphasis 
towards strategic nuclear and space forces. This, he argues, is 
driven by the Soviet perception that military power is increasingly a 
function of technological capability, and by the Soviet recognition 
that they are losing the economic - and particularly technological 
- competition with the west. As a result the strengthening of the 
Soviet technological base has become of vital concern of the 
General Staff. However given the scarcity of Soviet resources this 
can only be achieved by cutting back on military expenditure and 
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redirecting investments towards the civilian technology sector. 
Hence the Soviet General Staff interest in supporting Gorbachev's 
revolutionary refom1 attempts, and their willingness to make the 
hard choice to cut back on their theatre capability. 
McConnell uses the rest of this study to analyse how the Soviet 
military and civilian leadership plans to implement the strategic 
change in military doctrine. Chapters 2. and 3. details Soviet 
planning for the retreat in the theatre-nuclear and conventional 
military arenas. This is based on the radical shift in military doctrine 
away from the former emphasis upon maintaining a powerful 
offensive theatre capability, and towards a more defensive stance 
embodied in the post-Gorbachev notion of 'reasonable sufficiency'. 
This is a two-pronged effort, involving on the one hand the use of 
theatre-nuclear and conventional arms control to cover the Euro-
strategic retreat, and on the other hand the elaboration of a new 
Soviet theatre strategy and organisation. The outcome of both 
campaigns will obviously be of major consequence for Europe, and 
particularly for the smaller European states along the Soviet 
periphery. 
Here McConnell's treatment of the Soviet internal debate on the 
future of their theatre forces is enlightening. This reorganisation is 
presently in the mid planning stages and the final outcome is as yet 
undecided. However McConnell provides the basic data needed to 
make an educated guess as to its future development. He outlines 
the main currents of the vigorous debate within the General Staff 
and between the General Staff and the political leadership, and 
presents the proposals of key Soviet defence spokesmen. These are 
narrowed down to four main competing versions of the 'reasonable 
sufficiency' concept: versions I and 11 which include the provision 
for victory on the theatre level; version III which includes offensive 
capabilities only on the operational and tactical level; and finally 
version IV - the most 'defensive' - which only provides for 
offensive capabilities on the tactical level. McConnell devotes an 
entire chapter to this last version and the Soviet planning for its long 
term implementation. 
The bulk of the study is then devoted to the main future focus of 
Soviet military efforts, maintaining parity in the strategic nuclear 
sphere and developing an effective military capability in outer 
space. McConnell begins by tracing the recent evolution of Soviet 
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nuclear strategy, arguing firstly that it remains the vital priority of 
Soviet military thinking, and secondly that it is shifting increasingly 
towards a counterforce and war fighting posture. This requires a 
degree of defence against nuclear attack, which McConnell 
contends is a growing priority among Soviet military planners. And 
this in turn necessitates effective space-based systems. However 
here the key is technology, and it precisely in this field- intimately 
tied to the civilian sector - that the USSR is weakest. Hence, 
McConnell argues, the strong interest of the military in developing 
the Soviet civilian economy, since this in effect is the only way for 
the Soviet Union to retain a degree of strategic nuclear parity 
into the 1990's. 
The conclusion of the study is that the Soviet are retreating on the 
theatre nuclear and conventional front and shifting their military 
efforts to the strategic nuclear sphere. McConnell does not attempt 
an exact prediction of the end results of these trends. Nor is such a 
prediction possible. However in the study he provides a thoughtful 
and meticulously sourced guideline to the main currents directing 
the future orientation of Soviet military doctrine. 
This study is an updated and modified version of James 
McConnell's paper on the same topic presented at The Third Oslo 
International Symposium: The High North 2010, arranged by the IFS 
in Oslo between 18-22 June 1989. It is tightly argued, logically 
presented and backed up by a wealth of Soviet sources, and 
provides an authoritative analysis of the present status of Soviet 
military thinking and its likely future direction. 
Tomas Ries 
Nonvegian Institute for Defence Studies 
September 1990 
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Introduction 
The hazards of pronouncing on a future over two decades away are 
too easily appreciated to have to dilate on the subject here. The 
methodology is simple: to identify those significant trends -
military-political and military-technological - in the current 
environment that appear to have the staying power to live on into 
the next century and shape Soviet military strategy, including its 
conventional, !heater-nuclear, and strategic-nuclear varieties. But 
we must remember that trends disappear, become transformed, 
even reverse themselves, and new <<law-governed regularities>> (to 
use a Soviet term) come into existence, which events have done 
little to prepare us to anticipate. Just to take one example from our 
own time: Who, at the outset of the 1980s, could have predicted 
perestroyka? At that time, it was not even a gleam in Gorbachev's 
eye. 
The reference to perestroyka is happy in its timing, since the 
innovation, as it applies to military affairs, is surely the most 
significant of the trends that can shape military strategy out to the 
year 2010. Even if Gorbachev fails in his larger objective of 
reconstructing the political, economic, and socio-cultural frame-
work of the USSR, the core program of favoring high-tech 
investment is a good bet for successful implementation, and this 
cannot be carried off without taking resources away from the 
development of some currently favored military options. Realloca-
ting resources is a traditional Soviet way of resolving problems, and 
has little to do with the fundamental reforms put on the agenda by 
perestroyka. 
Responsible Western decision-makers are right to be skeptical as 
long as Soviet words on arms reduction are not translated into 
deeds, but from a purely analytical standpoint there are good 
reasons to expect a decisive reduction in the threat. If Moscow 
comes even close to implementing its announced arms control 
agenda - talk is said to be cheap, but it is not, it is only cheaper 
than action - the USSR will have divested itself of advantages in a 
whole series oflimited military options that it had spent a fortune to 
acquire over the last couple of decades. Aside from assured 
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destruction, the only option in which the Soviet posture will 
probably not be materially impaired by arms control is that for 
fighting a limited intercontinental nuclear war; the proposed 50-
percent reduction in strategic warheads will cut cunterforce capabi-
lities, but it will also make counterforce commensurately easier by 
limiting the targets of an attack. Its advantages in all other limited 
options - Eurostrategic, tactical-nuclear, and conventional -
Moscow is evidently prepared to abandon. 
This, then, is a current trend - toward arms control and the 
abandonment of military options, with the crucial exception of the 
option for world nuclear war. However, there is also another trend 
favoring renewed attention to the option for world nuclear war -
the military-technological trend toward the militarization of space. 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that there may be a 
connection between these two trends. Why has Moscow made its 
truly astonishing arms-control proposals? Although many motives 
have been offered in the USSR and in the West, circumstantial 
evidence and some Soviet testimony suggest that the precipitating 
event was Reagan's 1983 threat to shift the military competition to 
space, and the ensuing Soviet conviction that only through lavish 
investments in civilian information technology could the USSR 
hope to get the same military-space <<reverse spin-off,, that a 
competitive civilian economy in the West, without design or plan, 
had yielded to its defense establishment. In short, the first (military-
political) trend toward arms reductions may have been occasioned 
hy the second (military-technological) trend threatening the 
militarization of space. 
But it will be argued, even if the spectre of military-technological 
defeat was seminal in the turn to arms reduction-and that is by no 
means certain - it does not necessarily follow that the USSR will 
revert to militarism as its mainstay once the economic infrastruc-
ture for state security is repaired. The Soviets will have built up a 
new set of vested interests around the comforts of perestroyka, it is 
said, and the people will be most reluctant to return to the 
asceticism demanded by a competitive war economy. If I am 
skeptical of this, it is not because of any vulgar-conservative argu-
ment to the effect that a leopard never changes it spots. There is 
nothing inherent in Marxism or Leninism that led the Soviet Union 
to militarism; and it was probably not vested interests that put them 
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there or kept them there. It was at bottom a rational calculation of 
comparative advantage, the same calculation that is made in the 
West, except the West, not unnaturally, perceives its comparative 
advantage to lie in a different direction than Moscow's. The Soviets 
apparently discovered, through a process of trial and error, that a 
leading role for the USSR in the international system would be a 
long time coming if reliance were to be put on economic 
competition, whereas such a role could almost immediately be 
realized if the Kremlin exploited its ability to impose a real burden 
of defence on its own people several times larger than that of its 
Western competitors. 
Even if perestroyka succeeds in restoring Soviet growth, that is 
not going to change the terms of this thoroughly rational calculus. 
The Soviets may forget the lessons learned the hard way in the flush 
of enthusiasm for perestroyka, but life will teach it to them again: If 
they rely exclusively on economic competition, they will lose. The 
West should welcome perestroyka; like peaceful coeistence and 
related concepts of the post-Stalin era, it will reduce the ideological 
distance between the two systems, and to this extent will reduce the 
Soviet drive to compete. Nevertheless, the Soviet drive to compete 
has not disappeared. And the competition that remains is likely to 
take a more militarily effective form, thanks to perestroyka itself. 
What does all this mean for the military-strategic sphere? 
Judging by the Soviet arms-control posture, which reflects an 
abandonment of limited earthbound military options on a long-term 
basis, Moscow probably views aerospace as the coming area of 
competition. This is where the technological challenge is most 
daunting, but also where success will be more rewarding in the 
promotion and protection of vital interests. Analysts continue to 
predictilieendciilienuclearera,butin~titm~bejust 
beginning. 
It is still possible, of course, that once arms-control removes the 
threat posed by the USSR in traditional spheres, the U.S. and USSR 
will be able to strike a bargain continuing the ban on a 
comprehensive BMD. More likely, however, there will be an 
agreement for mutual deployment that will be restricted in their 
capabilities to defend national territories in a global conflict but 
adequate to handle third-party threats and unauthorized or 
accidental launches. There is evidence that some elements in 
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Moscow have already come around to this view. If there is a 
meeting of minds in East and West to this end, it will mean a 
continuation of the competition but, at least for a while, in a 
regulated way. 
In presenting details in the pages that follow, attention will first 
be focused on the arms-control trend toward reducing the 
importance of Soviet conventional and theater-nuclear strategies, 
and then on the trend toward enhancing the relative importance of 
the strategic-nuclear sphere, in both its offensive and defensive 
aspects. 
1 1 
Reasonable sufficiency: 
Immediate implications 
A profound change has taken place in the Soviet declaratory 
position on military affairs. Two years in gestation,! the great 
breakthrough came with the promulgation of the new military 
doctrine of <<reasonable sufficiency>> or <<sufficiency for defense>> by 
the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in May 
1987.2 The new doctrine has implications for both strategic nuclear 
and for other options, especially conventional war with NATO. The 
strategic-nuclear side, however, is less affected by the <<new 
thinking,>> and we will reserve discussion of it until later, 
concentrating for the time being on the conventional implications 
of reasonable sufficiency. 
How does Moscow define conventional sufficiency? According 
to Minister of Defense Yasov, <<For conventional capabilities, 
sufficiency envisages that quantity and quality of armed forces and 
armaments capable of reliably ensuring the collective defense of the 
socialist community ... >>3 This is not very helpful, since the Russian 
word for defense (oborona) has the same ambiguity as in English. It 
should be determined whether the word is to be understood in its 
socio-political sense (defense as opposed to attack and aggression) 
or in its military-technical sense as what the Soviets call a «type (or 
method) of combat action>> (defense as opposed to offense).4 It is 
clear from Soviet discussions that both senses of the term are 
involved.s On the one hand, argued First Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff Lobov, <<We are not preparing our armed forces to 
attack some other state ... >> On the other hand, according to Lobov, 
defense <<as a type of combat action>> also prevails in the Soviet 
calculation. Although it is nice to hear that Moscow has no 
aggressive intentions, it is important to know how the matter stands 
with defense versus offense. In this instance, Lobov's claim that 
<<generally the military-technical essence of our doctrine is 
defensive>>r, can only be accepted with qualifications. It is easy to 
accept this with respect to the long-term implications of sufficiency 
but not with respect to its current implications. 
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An article published in the summer of 1988 by two staff 
members of the Institute for the U.S., Andrcy Kokoshin and retired 
General-Major Valentin Larionov, addressed the current and the 
long-term implications of sufficiency. Kokoshin is a Deputy 
Director of the Institute; Larionov, for long years with the Military-
Science Directorate of the General Staff and with the Voroshilov 
Academy of the General Staff, is famous in the West for his part in 
drafting the 1962 book Military Strategy, edited by Marshal V.D. 
Sokolovskiy. In the summer of 1987 Kokoshin and Larionov 
collaborated on an article that provided one of the earliest indi-
cations that Moscow might be on the verge of serious conventional 
arms control proposals.7 A year later, in their 1988 article, they 
postulated, for heuristic purposes, four hypothetical versions of a 
defensive strategy for the two blocs. 
The first version is not a defensive strategy at all, except in the 
socio-political sense. The party subjected to attack will not, even 
initially assume a defensive posture, but will immediately go on the 
offensive, at the strategic as well as the operational and tactical 
levels, until the enemy is completely defeated. Because both parties 
will take the offensive simultaneously in an attempt to shift the 
conflict to the other side's territory, the war from the very beginning 
will be characterized by a series of what the Soviets call «meeting 
battles.»s The Soviets are now quite frank in stating that Version I 
had pride of place in Soviet strategy both in the 1930s and in the 
postwar period right down to the promulgation of the new Warsaw 
Pact doctrine in May 1987.9 
Version 11 and Ill of a <<defensive» strategy need to be discussed 
together, because they are competitors for selection as the principal 
version at the present time (though not ultimately). In Version 11, 
following the enemy's attack, the USSR will take up a defensive 
posture rather than the offensive posture of Version I. «After 
repelling the [opponent's] offensive in the course of a defensive 
battle that allows for a retreat and the abandonment of some 
territory,•> the USSR will still have the capability- «using reserves 
brought up from the depth-to shift over to a decisive counteroffen-
sive (if necessary, even over to a general offensive) to the point of 
completely defeating [razgrom] the opponent on his own territory.» 
Version Ill is less ambitious. It also envisages a successful initial 
defense followed by a counteroffensive, but only to the point of 
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restoring the status quo ante; the opponent will not have to cope 
with a decisive offensive on his own territory. Version II, like 
Version I examined earlier, assumes offensives at all three levels of 
the military art - strategic, operational and tactical. Version III 
envisages offensives only at the operational and tactical levels, not 
the strategic. The model for Version 11 is the Battle of Kursk in 
1943, when the Soviet Supreme High Command intentionally -
and not out of weakness - adopted a defensive posture against the 
Germans; after repelling the enemy offensive, Moscow began a 
counteroffensive, which was subsequently transformed into a 
general offensive taking the war into the heart of Germany. The 
model for Version III is the Battle ofKhalkin-Gol in 1939, when the 
Soviets, after stopping the Japanese invasion of Mongolia, decided 
not to carry the war to the territory from which the invasion was 
launched. ID 
It is clear from events that the Warsaw Pact doctrine of May 
1987 did not pronounce in favor of either of these «defensive» 
versions; it simply stipulated that «the basic method of action of the 
Soviet armed forces in repelling aggression will be defensive 
operations and combat action,» 11 leaving open the question of what 
to do after the aggression has been repelled. This failure to 
pronounce permitted a dispute to break out between a coalition of 
military strategists and military and civilian military-policy analysts 
favoring Version 1112 and a group of retired military and civilian 
military-policy analysts espousing Version Ill.IJ Initially, the 
proponents of Version 11 seemed to be in a secure position, but in 
the summer of 1988 the balance shifted away from them. The 
defection of Kokoshin and General-Major Larionov is revealing on 
this score. In the summer of 1987, they had held up the Battle of 
Kursk, the model for Version 11, as meeting the standards of reason-
able sufficiency at the current stage.l4 In an interview in September 
1988, however, when asked whether Soviet policy still favored 
Version 11, Kokoshin answered; 
That assessment could have been regarded as accurate even three months 
ago, but is already out of date. Things are moving very quickly here. There is 
a real possibility that the USSR will adopt the third model as its goaL We shall 
see what the results are of the currelll major review of military strategy.>>/5 
Later, in this statement before the House Armed Services 
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Committee in March 1989, Kokoshin said that <<the objective of the 
armed forces of each side ... would be simply to restore the situation 
which existed before the outbreak of hostilities - the status quo 
antebellum- without crossing the border of the other side ... ,l6 
Larionov made the same point in an April 1989 interview with a 
Western reporter.' 7 Although this implied the ascendancy, if not the 
ultimate triumph, of Version III, at that time defenders of Version IJ 
were not yet prepared to concede defeat. 18 However, a subsequent 
unsigned N ovosti Press Agency article published in Poland 
claimed that the abandonment of large-scale strategic-offensive 
operations to achieve victory and substitution of the objective of 
reestablishing the status quo ante had been incorporated into <<all 
fundamental documents, including combat regulations.» 19 
The difference between these two versions of a «defensive» 
strategy would be of less interest if they represented simply a 
difference in war plans, leaving capabilities the same; war plans, 
after all, can be changed in relatively short order. However, there 
was also a difference in advocated force structures. Proponents of 
Version III generally seemed to favor significant unilateral 
reductions in general purpose forces, against the militant opposition 
of proponents of Variant 11. There is little in the record, however, to 
suggest that the latter were in principle against a Version Ill force 
structure for the USSR, provided that it was the result of negotiated 
mutual reductions, even if asymmetricaJ.20 
The dispute was settled with Gorbachev's announcement of 
unilateral cuts of half a million men in the armed forces over the 
two years I 989-1990. Western analysts believe that the scheduled 
removal from the forward area of six tank divisions, the one air-
assault brigade, and all assault-landing bridging formations will 
sharply reduce the USSR's ability to launch a deep offensive on 
short notice.2' This development reflects a new access of influence 
for civilian foreign- and military-policy analysts, the so-called 
institutchiki. The initiative for unilateral steps in disarmament had 
come from them,22 against the solid opposition of the higher 
command.23 In the past Western analysts were criticized for using 
the views of the instituchiki as oblique evidence of Soviet 
intentions. It was said of them that (1) they know nothing except 
what appears in Western literature and (2) they have no influence.24 
These are two different matters; the first proposition can be false 
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and the other true. At the time, there appeared to be good grounds 
for believing the military-policy analysts knew much more than 
they were being credited with in the West, but out of a lack of 
knowledge, no position could be taken on the question of influence, 
except to note privately that it would be strange for a regime 
believing so strongly in the political essence of war not to have a 
regular military-political review of strategic options. 
It now appears that the institutchiki have both knowledge and 
influence. Nikolay Shmelev recently revealed that, in the early 
1970s, a number of colleagues at his institute (unnamed) opposed 
the deployment of SS-20 missiles and even sent their protests to 
<<the top.>>2s How could they protest a deployment that they do not 
know is being contemplated? In the past, of course, Moscow relied 
more on war-waging capabilities for political impact, which meant 
a greater influence for military strategists, whereas today it would 
strain the military art all out of shape to use it to justify the tenets of 
reasonable sufficiency. The higher command may support pere-
stroyka because it promises future benefits - and I think they do 
support it for that reason-but they can hardly take heart from the 
current savaging of traditional Soviet military options on the advice 
of political scientists. As Kokoshin and Larionov have recently 
noted, while military professionals are actively involved in current 
discussions of military development, <<this issue is increasingly 
losing its narrowly military character,» and attracting the attention 
of policymakers, civilian scientists, and even the public.26 
This brings us down to Version IV, which is the long-term goal of 
reasonable sufftciency. 
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Reasonable sufficiency: 
long-term objective 
Version IV in the Kokoshin-Larionov scheme is the most defensive 
of the four hypothetical strategies. According to the authoritative 
May I 987 statement of the Warsaw Pact, the ultimate goal of arms 
control should be the reduction of forces in Europe to a level where 
neither alliance <<would have the means for a surprise attack on the 
other side or for mounting offensive operations at all.>>27 This 
objective would be realized in Version IV, the ultimate in a <<nun-
offensive defense,>> that is, a posture that would be defensive in the 
military-political sense and non-offensive in the military-strategic 
sense. Whereas Version I and 11 allowed for victory through an 
offensive at all three levels of the military art, and Version Ill at 
only the operational and tactical levels, Version IV admits a 
potential for tactical victory alone. «On a strategic and operational 
scale the concept of victory is ruled out.>>ls 
Version IV is to be realized in three different stages of negotiated 
arms control, further unilateral measures being ruled out, at least 
for the time being. The first stage (199 I -1994) calls for the 
elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in a number of arma-
ments categories (tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, 
tactical «Strike>> aircraft, combat helicopters), together with a 
reduction of the armed forces of both sides to a level 10 to 15 
percent below that now held by NATO; in this stage the Warsaw 
Pact would have to make far deeper reductions than NATO. The 
second stage (1994 through 1997) calls for the armed forces and 
armaments of both sides to be reduced, this time symmetrically, by 
another 25 percent (roughly 500,000 men). The third stage (1997 
through 2000) will be characterized by further mutual reductions 
and, more importantly, by deliberate efforts to restructure both 
alliances on exclusively defensive principles. The two sides would 
not simply renounce offensives; they would supposedly be 
incapable of offensives. It is interesting to note that, in principle, 
Version IV has the support of top military leaders,JO though we 
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may find, when it comes down to Soviet final proposals, that there is 
a devil in the details. 
Let us leave aside the question of whether, given the ambiguity of 
weapon systems, it is at all possible to create forces incapable of 
either strategic or operational offensives. Certainly the Soviets in 
general, and Kokoshin and Larionov in particular, have furnished 
no practical guides through this ticket. Some Western analysts even 
characterize the concept of non-offensive defense as utopian, on the 
order of the Soviet proposal to abolish all nuclear weapons. How-
ever, the two proposals are not lacking in realism to the same 
degree. At bottom, the much smaller standing armies of the Soviet 
proposal, however structured, may turn out much like the standing 
armies of the pre-World War I period, which were designed, not to 
take the offensive, but to cover mobilization. 
This raises an interesting question that we need to address. As far 
as one can tell from Soviet discussions, reasonable sufficiency and 
non-offensive defense apply only to standing armies. However, one 
can create reserves and mobilize them; does non-offensive defense 
govern their makeup and use? Here, too, a debate may already be 
shaping up. On the one hand, there are military-policy analysts who 
argue that any large-scale conventional conflict between the blocs 
would <<inevitably escalate,>> and it is only necessary to prevent an 
opponent's victory in a short, intense conventional conflict. Because 
a protracted war cannot be fought on a non-nuclear basis, the USSR 
can safely <<abolish its cumbersome system for mobilizing indu-
stry ... »JI Other military strategists and military-policy analysts 
seem to be sending a different message. Attention is now focused on 
lessons to be gained from discussions of the 1920s in the USSR, 
especially the arguments against a <<Strategy of annihilation» 
advanced by A.A. Svechin, who favored instead a so-called 
<<Strategy of attrition.>> According to Major General Larionov, 
rather than a short war decided by a few fast-paced offensive 
operations, Svechin's strategy of attrition emphasized «the pro-
tracted character of a future conflict, which would require 
mobilization of all the country's resources and a multi-option 
strategy.»l2 
The debate over a strategy of attrition may be related to another 
debate going on now in the USSR over changing the system for 
manning the armed forces to accord with the non-offensive defense 
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of Version IV.33 As in the case of their military strategy, some 
Soviet theorists are reaching back for guidance on manning into the 
1920s, when the USSR replaced the mass conscript army of the 
civil war and intervention period with a so-called <<mixed» 
recruiting system, combining a small volunteer cadre army with 
territorial-militia formations based on universal service.34 Military-
policy analyst Aleksey Arbatov is one of those favoring the shift 
over to a volunteer professional army; he is not concerned about 
manpower reserves because he is not in favor of a strategy of 
attrition. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev and his superior, 
Minister of Defense Yasov, however, are quite concerned about 
reserves. Moiseev's very first objection to voluntary recruitment is 
that it does not generate enough well-trained reserves, because of 
longer-term enlistments and smaller turnover of personnel on active 
duty. Hence, their preference for relatively short (two-year) 
conscript service, whereby even the small regular army of Version 
IV would yield large trained reserves36 The virtually unanimous 
rejection of the volunteer principle by the top military leadership37 
suggested until recently that it might never be instituted. However, 
worth noting is the recent opinion of the Chairman of the new 
Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence and Matters of State 
Security that a volunteer army <<would be stronger than the present 
one ... I disagree with those who say that the idea of a professional 
army should be rejected out of hand, so to speak, merely because it 
is not to the taste of certain military leaders.»3~ 
Surely, it makes a difference to the West how this debate turns 
out. If the General Staff gets its way with a strategy of attrition 
served by an unchanged manning system for the armed forces, the 
world may find itself moving away from a competition of standing 
armies, only to be caught up in a competition of mobilization 
potentials, that is, a transition from World War 11 to World War I 
scenarios. No doubt this is progress, but only a world that has lived 
for half a century under the gun of standing armies ready to go into 
action at any moment is likely to deem it a desirable state of affairs. 
But regardless of how the debate turns out on mobilization 
capabilities for a war of attrition, arms control seems slated to make 
standing armies poor instruments for conventional war and a 
peacetime diplomacy of force. Arms control will also cripple Soviet 
theater nuclear options. Eurostrategy has already been finished off 
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by the INF Treaty, and success in conventional arms reductions is 
almost certainly going to mean negotiated inroads on tactical-
nuclear capabilities. Standing armies may be left with punitive 
capabilities and an escalation bridge, but probably not with 
capabilities for fighting and winning theater nuclear wars. 
This leaves only strategic nuclear warfare relatively unconstrai-
ned. To be sure, arms control have even this option in its sights, but 
the proposed 50-percent reduction in warheads seems to put few 
additional difficulties in the way of counterforce capabilities for 
waging such a war. The Soviet declared objective ultimately 
eliminating all nuclear weapons is a non-starter, and their unofficial 
proposals for minimum-deterrent postures (in both their land-and 
sea-based versions),l9which are recommended as an intermediate 
step along the way to a nuclear- free world, have not attracted 
favorable official attention in the West. 
However, it is one thing to say there is latitude for competition in 
the strategic sphere. It is quite another thing to say the Soviets 
intend to exploit this latitude. Let us now take up the evidence for 
this. 
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Strategic nuclear sufficiency today 
The Soviet Union, not unreasonably, feels the strategic nuclear 
sphere will be the key arena of military competition in the future. 
As one officer puts it, <<maintaining the balance at the strategic level 
makes it possible to reduce the military potential at other lower 
levels of confrontation ... ,,4o Even Aleksey Arbatov, who is not 
uncritical of certain aspects of Soviet strategic policy, takes the 
same stand. He complains that <<a disproportionately large share of 
Soviet resources are directed toward the confrontation in nuclear 
and conventional am1ed forces and armaments in the !heaters of 
Eurasia, as well as toward the contest with the West on the seas and 
oceans, including near conflict regions of the developing world ... >> 
That emphasis, in his view, is misplaced. <<The pivotal element in 
the global military-strategic confrontation, which latter is the most 
important aspect of security, has been and still is the correlation of 
strategic offensive potentials of the USSR and the U.S.>> He adds 
that 
Maimaining the strategic balance is an unconditional priority of our security 
and defense policy, and our strategy and annamems programs. As long as 
nuclear weapons have not been eliminated everywhere and fully, this task 
remains the main guarantee of our security and should be fulfilled, whatever 
the cost ... Here. as they say, we will not quibble over the price.41 
Just as important is the character of the Soviet commitment to the 
strategic sphere. Although there are determined efforts to mislead 
the West on this score, it would appear that reasonable sufficiency 
has made very little change in the Soviet concept of global nuclear 
war. Sufficiency here is a call for parity, but a parity that has (to 
employ Soviet terminology) both <<qualitative>> and <<quantitative>> 
aspects. The qualitative aspect is said to deal with the ability to 
carry out a retaliatory strike inflicting unacceptable damage. 
References to quantity, on the other hand, as one Soviet author 
informs us, is a shorthand way of advocating counterforce 
capabilities.42 The celebrated formula of Eugene Primakov holds 
that, under reasonable sufficiency, <<the qualitative assessment of 
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parity comes to the fore, ... while the quantitative assessment still 
retains importance ... 43 Other writers in the mainstream confirm 
the continuing importance of the quantitative aspect. <<It is 
necessary to emphasize.» says Andrey Kokoshin, <<that one of the 
important factors in the stability of the military-strategic balance ... 
is the capacity of a country whose strategic forces have been 
subjected to attack of restoring the disturbed balance with a 
retaliatory strike against analogous forces belonging to the 
aggressor ... » And he subsequently added that one could speak of a 
military-strategic balance when <<the side subjected to attack ... 
retains the ability to hit in a retaliatory strike a broad class of 
military targets and to inflict unacceptable damage on the 
population and industry of the aggressor country ... >>44 As G.K 
Lednev says, the continued protestations of his compatriots that the 
USSR has only a punitive strategy and not a counterforce strategy 
<<recall the pilot who puts on his parachute and repeats that he does 
not acknowledge the laws of gravity.,,45 
Of course, the Soviets always present their interest in counter-
force as symmetrically retaliatory, but this does not necessarily 
follow even from their declaratory position. Moscow explicitly 
repudiates the unthinking Western interpretation that the Soviet 
pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons means no-first-use of 
strategic nuclear weapons. As Aleksey Arbatov explains <<This 
pledge refers to all nuclear weapons, without differentiating 
between strategic forces, intermediate-range, shorter-range, or 
tactical nuclear systems. In other words, the USSR will not consider 
itself constrained in launching a strategic retaliatory strike if the 
Americans use nuclear weapons against targets in any theater of 
war.>)46 
How does the current Soviet view of parity differ from that held 
before the promulgation of reasonable sufficiency? It doesn't; since 
Brezhnev's speech at Tula in 1977, the Soviets have emphasized 
parity in assured destruction, without renouncing counterforce 
options.47 Soviet capabilities for hard-target kill are almost 
exclusively a product of the period after Tula. At the same time that 
these capabilities were being introduced, Moscow adopted a new 
form of strategic operation - <<the strategic operation for repelling 
an opponent's aerospace attack.>> Evidence at the time was 
persuasive that this included ICBM action against an opponent's 
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strategic means of nuclear attack,48 and past speculation that it also 
included anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence49 has recently 
been supported in the literature.so 
Since the advent of reasonable sufficiency, the quantitative side 
seems to have assumed even greater prominence. In a work 
published in 1988, well after the announcement of reasonable 
sufficiency, three distinguished theoreticians said the Soviet armed 
forces as a whole had three <<basic>> tasks that were of <<vital 
importance to the state.» These were as follows, in the order 
repeatedly given throughout the book: <<repelling an opponent's 
aerospace attack:» <<suppressing the potential of an opponent's war 
economy;» and <<destroying groupings of an opponents's armed 
forces,» without which <<the war's political objectives cannot, as a 
rule, be achieved and a victorious outcome to it cannot be 
concluded.»51 Thus, two tasks out of the top three are counterforce, 
and the first enumerated task is not countervalue (qualitative) but 
counterstrategic (quantitative). 
In private conversations with Westerners, Soviet institutchiki 
attempt to down play the significance of this work. Statements made 
about the book in the Soviet press, where one would expect a 
reluctance to mislead Soviet cadres, should be more reliable. In this 
connection, according to Aleksandr Savel'ev, on the staff of the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations in 
Moscow, one can <<conclude>>, judging by the current military-
strategic and military-political literature, that, <<at present,» the 
three missions enumerated above are in fact the Soviet armed 
forces' <<main tasks,>> that they involve both conventional and 
nuclear scenarios, and that «planning the makeup of the armed 
forces and modeling the various options for their possible employ-
ment» are carried out using these tasks as a point of departure. 52 
The content of the counterstrategic mission has also been 
expanded - from land to sea. Until the appearance of the 1988 
work mentioned above, the «main>> task of the Soviet Navy by far 
and away had been SSBN countervalue «action against the shore;>> 
destroying the opponent's SSBNs, by contrast, was considered 
<<Secondary,» and apparently mainly involved strikes against SSBN 
bases.53 There was no evidence in the literature that combating 
SSBNs had been integrated into the «strategic operation for 
repelling an oponent's aerospace attack.« 
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Now, the very first mtsswn of the Soviet Navy is listed as 
<<repelling an opponent's aerospace attack from ocean axes» by 
destroying his sea-based nuclear delivery platforms; These must be 
constantly tracked in peacetime and <<simultaneously» hit at the 
very beginning of the war, <<regardless of the type of weapons being 
used,» conventional or nuclear. «The basic objective of this combat 
action is to prevent or reduce as much as possible the damage that 
can be inflicted on the state by the opponent's aerospace retaliatory 
strike.>> In the future, it is predicted, space-based nonacoustic means 
will play a <<big role>> in detecting submarines.54 
That Moscow is prepared to compete stoutly in this field is 
evident from a recent Pravda article by V.S. Etkin, Chief of the 
Applied Space Physics Department of the Academy of Sciences' 
Space Research Institute. He attributes to<< U.S. specialists>> a belief 
- almost certainly held in fact by his own compatriots - <<that the 
country - U.S. or USSR - which first manages to create a space 
system for detecting submarines will achieve military superiority,» 
i.e., by Soviet definition, the ability to fight and win an all-out 
nuclear war without incurring unacceptable damage. That this was 
not simply a unilateral striving on the part of America was tacitly 
admitted in the author's subsequent reference to <<the competition 
to acquire such space means.,,ss 
However, expansion of counterforce ambitions from land to sea 
is not the only indication of a Soviet preoccupation with strategic 
war- waging. There is also the technological trend toward space 
weaponry, which seems slated to dominate the moves and 
countermoves of the coming decades. 
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Strategic nuclear sufficiency 
in the foreseeable future 
In the introduction, the hypothesis was advanced that there may be 
a connection between the emerging potential for space warfare and 
the Soviet decision to negotiate radical reductions in general-
purpose forces. Why did Moscow decide in favor of these reduc-
tions? Numerous reasons have been advanced in the the 
West - politico-military,56 foreign policy,57 narrowly military,ss 
economic.59 There is also a school, to which this author belongs, 
that postulates immediate economic but ultimately military reasons 
as the factor that tipped the scales. 
Certainly, Moscow is concerned about the Jag in economic 
growth evident since the mid-1970s. At that time, Brezhnev had 
abandoned the traditional high-investment (<<extensive>>) approach 
to growth, ostensibly in favor of a better use of resources 
(<<intensification>>); actually there was very little intensification, 
even of the traditional kind. It is not generally appreciated in the 
West how much of Gorbachev's initial program for <<accelerating 
socio-economic development>> represented a reversion to traditio-
nal practices - higher investment in heavy industry, especially 
machine-building, coupled with discipline in the work place, the 
anti-alcohol campaign, hortatory appeals to Soviet man's better 
nature, and so forth. It was only later, in large part in the interest of 
intensification, that Gorbachev added his perestroyka founded on 
non-traditional principles, but even today <<acceleration>> based on 
high investment lies at the heart of the Kremlin's economic strategy 
and is likely to survive the setbacks that perestroyka might suffer in 
the future. 
The Kremlin's high-investment strategy has a narrow focus -
the information-technology component of machine-building. The 
economist Nikolay Shmelev is even of the opinion that this 
technology is <<the only field that demands a high degree of 
growth... It is unnecessary for Soviet traditional industries to 
achieve vigorous growth ... ,,6o There is a sense of great urgency in 
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the Soviet concern for inforrnatics. According to an article in the 
Central Committee's political journal, 
the entire df!l•e/oped lvorld is JWW entering on a new economic era, in which 
information becomes the main economic factor. If we do not start 
implementing an infonnatics de~·elopment prograrn in the near tenn, then -
without any exaggeration - by the end of the century we will find ourselves 
outside the bounds of moden1 civilization. 61 
The economic Jag in turn will adversely affect national security. 
As two officials of the Foreign Ministry note, 
It is 110 accidem thm political authorities in industrially developed coumries 
are today confronted by the need to choose: either invest in civilian research, 
ensuring the competitiveness of national industJ)' and consequently economic 
development, or create new armamems, taking the risk of falling behind in the 
scientific-technological race and therebJ' weakening the economic and, in the 
final analysi.1; the defense potential of the state ... 62 
One arrives, then, at the paradoxical conclusion: to enhance 
security, the USSR must cut security expenditures. Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze says: 
today, as never before, the ability of the armed forces to carry out their 
mission depends direct(v and mainly on a strong economy and a high(v 
developed science. 
Today, it is not so rnuclz its weapons stockpiles that are of decisive 
impm1ancc for the state's security as it is the ability to create and produce 
neu• 1veapons63 
There is a tendency in the West to regard the projected cuts in 
Soviet forces as one more non-traditional item in Gorbachev's 
perestroyka; hence the reflex assumption that, if perestroyka fails, 
all bets are off on arms control. However, there are precedents in 
Soviet history for cuts in current military capabilities that had the 
effect of benefitting the economy immediately and national security 
ultimately-in the 1920s, the late 1940s after World War !I, and in 
Khrushchev's day from 1954 to 1960.64 
There is no question but that the Soviet military expects to benefit 
from <<acceleration,>>65 At the risk of being charged with <<looking 
for clouds in silver linings>> we must try to estimate the relative 
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balance of projected economic and military benefits in the Soviet 
calculation. Is Moscow more interested in consumer welfare, in 
economic growth per sea as an index of great-power status, or in 
competititve military achievements to strengthen its global political 
influence? Obviously, all these motives are present, if in some cases 
(consumer welfare) only instrumentally; the question is which one 
has the greater weight. 
For an attempt at an answer, let us turn first to a remarkable 
article of the era of glasnost' - the sort one never expected to 
appear in the Soviet press. The article was written by two 
institutchiki, Aleksey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov,and published 
in the journal International Affairs, which has been taken under the 
wing of the Foreign Ministry.66 According to the authors, the 
considerable foreign policy successes of the Soviet Union have 
never been predicated on its economy. «<ndeed; in the 70 years of 
its existence the Soviet Union has not been able to come even close 
to the level of production efficiency and living standards of the 
leading capitalist countries, particularly the US ... >> Soviet foreign-
policy successes rather have been <<primarily due to such factors as 
the USSR's military strength ... and the systematic allocation of a 
higher share of our national income to the needs of foreign and 
military policy than the governments of Western countries could 
provide in peacetime.>> The authors are unwilling to make a blanket 
critique of this emphasis on military strength; they simply question 
any automatic link between military strength and successful 
diplomacy. They especially single out for celebration the attainment 
of strategic parity and stress the requirement to keep America from 
regaining superiority; they thus establish their own priorities - in 
the strategic nuclear sphere67 - which, as we have seen, are also 
the priorities of their compatriots. 
According to Izyumov and Kortunov, when the Soviet economy 
began to Jag in the mid-1970s this did not generate concern 
because the economic weakness was being compensated for by an 
access of military strength. <<In the second half of the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its potential 
both in nuclear and in conventional armaments on the continent. 
Never had the military balance in Europe emerged so favorably for 
the USSR and its allies ... >> The alarm bells only began to ring when 
the economic decline began to impact negatively on scientific 
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technological progress, especially in informatics, which in turn was 
seen to have adverse implications for defense.68 
In this situation; the authors see the USSR as having only two 
options. The first is to continue along the old track, but in the end 
this will ruin Soviet defense. <<Exhaustion of the economy under the 
growing burden of military-policy expenditures will increasingly be 
reflected in the purely military-technical component of our power, 
especially if the arms race spreads to space,» as the U.S. SDI 
program dictates. The other option is to hold down foreign-policy 
and military expenditures in order to bolster the economy. 
Deliberately expressed, as the authors themselves say, «in military 
language,>> this second option <<is tantamount to 'falling back to 
previously prepared positions in order to minimize losses and 
accumulate forces'.,,69 
The clear implication is that, having accumulated sufficient 
forces, the USSR (to continue with the authors' military metaphor) 
will conterattack; Moscow will not have to fall back forever. <<At 
this stage the need becomes urgent to adopt a doctrine that would 
ensure us the breathing space required for reconstructing the 
USSR's economy ... >>70 No Soviet reader would miss the implica-
tions of the authors' reference to a <<breathing space>> or <<respite>> 
(peredyshka); this was the very word Lenin used in his speech to the 
Congress of Soviets in March 1918, urging ratification of the 
onerous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany.<< We need peace,>> 
said Lenin at the time, <<to gain a breathing space to give the masses 
a chance to create new forces of life. In all probability that 
breathing space will be of short duration ... After we have rested, 
then, together with the international proletariat, we shall start a new 
October Revolution, but this time on a world scale.>>7I 
Izyumov and Kortunov are not the only Soviets now evoking the 
Brest Peace as a lesson for the times.n The Soviets have com-
plained about some Western interpretations of their current 
intitiatives - that the USSR only wants a respite form domestic 
problems, after which it will throw itself with new energy into the 
arms race?73 Yet the Soviets themselves raise the Brest analogy and 
argue the need for a peredyshka, also interprented by them as a 
falling back in order to regroup and generate the strength for a 
counterblow. 
There is, however, one big difference between Lenin's and 
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Gorbachev's peredyslika. Lenin thought of his as short-lived, a 
matter of months; but Gorbachev wants his new course to be 
understood as strategic and not simply tactical.74We probably 
should believe him. lzyumov and Kortunov ask only that a military 
emphasis be avoided for the <<foreseeable future,,75 an expression 
usually denoting the next I 0 to 15 years. Colonel Proektor, too, 
feels that a diminution in the significance attached to a policy of 
force is <<a trend of the present and foreseeable future.>> 76 According 
to Aleksey Arbatov, the USSR considers reductions in the military 
burden <<a priority task of our military policy up to the year 
2000.>>77 That is also Gorbachev's planning horizon; his Compre-
hensive Program for Accelerating Socio-Economic Development 
stops at the year 2000. After that, Moscow will have to take stock 
anew. lzyumov and Kortunov cite with approval Lenin's remark 
that communism will vanquish the old social order only through 
higher economic efficiency, but if competition between the two 
systems is the name of the game, that is advice for losers. Credible 
Western forecasts suggest that, even ifperestroyka is successful, the 
best estimate is for average annual Soviet growth of 3 percent_78 At 
the rate, the USSR will be busily engaged for a long time in over-
taking and surpassing capitalism. The temptation to seek respect 
through military strength is going to be strong. 
Izyumov and Kortunov's reference to the vulnerability of their 
country's economy <<if the arms race spreads to space>> reflects the 
probable priority concern of the Kremlin. As Deputy Foreign 
Minister Petrovskiy puts it, the US creation of a comprehensive 
ABM system <<may be of no less importance for military relations of 
the late 20th and early 21st century than the stockpiling of nuclear 
arms was for the decades since World War 11.>>79 Gorbachev 
himself, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in November 1985, 
complained of the imperialists that, 
in undenaking an anns race in space, they hope to surpass us in electronics 
and computers, but we will find an answer ... 
Our cou/l/1}' will not allow parity to be disrupted. The Soviet Union will 
have to restore the balance ... so 
Earlier research has noted the correlation between the U.S. move 
to shift the competition to space, the emergence of the Soviet 
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concept of economic acceleration, and the concomitant debate over 
wheter to cut expenditures on either social programs or 
conventional military capabilities. SI It must have been with a mounting 
sense of dismay that Moscow reviewed the evidence of the Reagan 
Administration's interest in space, even before the President's SDI 
speech of March 1983 - the leak to Aviation Week of the successful 
X-ray laser test in 1981, the public position taken in 1982 by High 
Frontier, the head of which was the military advisor of Reagan's 
campaign, and so forth.s2 In one of his last acts as General Secretary 
in late October 1982, Brezhnev assembled at the Kremlin the elite 
of his officer corps, informing them of a <<special need» to speak of 
strengthening the material foundations of the armed forces. <<The 
struggle in the military-technological field has been sharply 
exacerbated, often assuming a fundamentally new character. A lag 
in this struggle is unacceptable.»83 What may have been troubling 
him can be surmised from a charge levelled by T ASS commentator 
Leonid Ponomarev earlier that month: Washington is <<now 
planning a military breakthrough into outer space.»B4 American 
<<preparations for a war in space>> were also the subject of an 
October Revolution Day article that year by Minister of Defence 
Ustinov;Ss there can be no doubt that he was referring to a space-
strategic defense. 86 In January 1983, Moscow took the problem to 
its allies; the Pact leadership concluded that <<the arms race is 
shifting to a qualitatively new, much more dangerous phase,» 
involving <<systems and means for conducting combat operations in 
space and from space.,B7 
Acknowledgement of a compelling need to change economic 
policy followed closely. The first casualty was Brezhnev's low-
investment strategy; the achieved investment growth rate for the 
1981-85 planning period was over two-thirds higher than that 
projected in November 1981. The increase in the investment 
growth rate of machine building was even more rapid. ss The turn· 
around in that sector was already revealed in the 1983 output 
figures.s9 The well-known Soviet economist Aganbegyan dates the 
<<beginning of the restoration process» to General-Secretary Andro-
pov's maiden speech at the November 1982 Central Committee 
Plenum,90 which reflected a clear awareness of the USSR's 
economic problems but seemed to be short on remedies. A few 
months later, in January-February 1983, Tat'yana Zaslavskaya was 
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writing her critique of the Soviet economic system - the so-called 
«Novosibirsk Document,» which was presented to a high-level 
seminar in April 1983.91 Two months later, a Central Committee 
Plenum officially endorsed the notion that economic reform was 
«not simply a wish - but an objective necessity.»n 
Having decided on higher investment, the problem then evidently 
became one of paying for it. There were rumors already from the 
turn of 1982-83 that Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov was at 
odds with the political leadership. However, the conflict only broke 
into the open in materiel sent to the printer in April 1983, a little 
over one month after Reagan's SDI speech. Western observers of 
the fight for resources in 1983-84 have assumed Ogarkov was 
demanding higher allocations; the evidence suggests, however, that 
he was trying to hold on to what he had, specifically the very 
expensive option for protracted general conventional war adopted 
as the basis for the military side of the five-year plan 1981-85. 
Arranged against Orgakov was General-Secretary Chernenko's 
presumed shield-bearer, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact 
Kulikov, who argued by implication that, since a conventional war 
between the blocs would <<inevitably» escalate - something no 
Soviet had said for a decade - expensive conventional capabilities 
were unnecessary. At this point in the debate, the issue was whether 
Soviet capabilities should be reduced unilaterally, much as Khrush-
chev had done in the 1950s. It took Gorbachev to put the reductions 
on a mutual basis; the imperialists would be asked to disarm at the 
same time as the USSR, certainly a more attractive course for the 
Soviet militaryYJ 
To the extent that the Western observers have identified a mili-
tary interest in eliminating the Soviet Jag in advanced technology, 
they have tended to interpret it as primarily a concern over the 
USSR's competitiveness in conventional warfare. Technological 
innovations in earthbound options, however, are relatively margi-
nal, whereas in space, with its utter dependence on informatics and 
miniaturization, the Western advantage can be decisive for the fate 
of the USSR. That Soviet analysts appreciate the American com-
parative advantage in space warfare is evident from their charge 
that the US took up SDI only when events of the 1970s and early 
1980s demonstrated <<the hopelessness of attempts to win the arms 
race in the traditional spheres.>>H4 Beyond the American compara-
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tive advantage, Moscow is likely to have in mind that strategic 
nuclear war offers the greatest physical threat to the USSR and 
affects its most vital interests. In the apparent Soviet view, to keep a 
war at the conventional level the victor's objective can only be the 
occupation of a defeated opponent's territory, not the replacement 
of his social system. The stability of a regional nuclear war between 
the blocs depends on confining threats of overthrowing social 
systems to only one or, at the most, <<several>> countries of the 
opposing bloc. In a strategic nuclear war, however, the entire social 
systems of both alliances are deemed to be at stake.95 
An article published early in the movement for economic reform 
by the influential political analyst Fedor Burlatskiy revealed the 
priority Soviet security concern. According to the author, in the 
mid-1970s a new technological revolution began, founded on 
micro electronics and information. <<Mini-computers, integrated 
circuits, industrial robots, microprocessors - these are the holy of 
holies of the technological revolution.>> For all the positive aspects 
of this revolution, <<it is impossible to rid oneself of an oppressive 
sense of alarm, seeing the direction and manner in which the 
capitalist centers of industrial might are directing these achieve-
mentS.>> Burlatskiy continues in this vein for some time. 
Who will dare claim that technological progre;,· can be hannful? 
Teclmophobia... is now archaic, like nostalgia for horse cans or bark 
sandal;: Nevertheless ... we should still look at the other side of the coin, for 
the Sill! can bum if il is misused What can we not say, then. of technological 
progre.\'!J~ which more than once has brought harm to men, e~pecia/ly in the 
militmy jield? 
Indeed according to the author, «present-day technology is 
producing the most dangerous burns, first-degree burns, burns that 
will not heal, in military affairs ... >> He refers to the technological 
revolution that is spreading to conventional armaments, but that is 
not the crux of his concern. 
The greatest step, not a step, a leap, <~·en a breakthrough imo the unknown, is 
the del'elopment of militm}' space systems. We do not have to guess what lies 
behind the «Star Wm:s>> program of President R Reagan On the strength of 
their achieveme!lls, primarily in the field of electronics, as u:e/1 as by 
exploiting Japan's potential, the Americans hope to achieve superiority over 
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the USSR in the military jield. The means ifllended for so-called «Space wars>> 
are anti-satellite and anti-missile ~)'sterns. To be very precise, iT is these 
~)rstem~~ used to destroy an opponent's missile~~ that constitute the last ~vord 
in the technology of tonWITOW ... 
He concludes with the rhetorical question: 
So, what is the moral, and what the solution? The solution lies in rnore active 
effons by the socialist countries ... to master the latest achievements of science 
and technology ... 96 
To be sure, it is true that the Gorbachev investment effort is 
focused on civilian machine-building,97 but this by no means rules 
out national security as the ultimate concern. Here the American 
experience has been instructive for the Soviets. SDI was not the 
product of a deliberate military research and development project; 
an informed estimate is that 90 percent of its components came 
from the marketing end of a competitive civilian industry that had 
no military objectives in mind at all. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory has made much the same point about his 
Brilliant Pebbles concept. Of the three gross components of a 
Brilliant Pebble, he remarks, two- the «eyes» and the <<brain,» so 
to speak - can be bought relatively cheaply compared to the third 
component, its <<legs,>> a miniaturized rocket propulsion system; this 
is because the first two have been involved in the intense 
competition for the consumer dollar. Wood jokes that, if American 
teenagers had only developed a taste for high-performance rockets 
over the past decade, even the cost of <<legs>> might have shrunk 
dramatically by now.98 The point is that, in the West, you can get 
unplanned results, but not in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets give every sign of recognizing this. At a recent 
conference on conversion of war industry to civilian production, 
Andrey Kokoshin pointed out that in the 1960s, when the impetus 
for computer development both in the U.S. and USSR came from 
military requirements, Soviet models were state-of-the art, <<neck-
and-neck» in the running with America. Subsequently, however, the 
mainstream of development in the West moved over into <<the 
commercial market,>> but not in the Soviet Union. <<With us 
everything stayed primarily in the military enclave, and we had 
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already begun to Jag sharply at the start of the 1970s.» During the 
ensuing decade, when civilian informatics in the West drew even 
further ahead, there began what the calls a <<process of reverse 
spinoff,>> in which gains in civilian technology started to spill over 
into the military domain- in the West, but not in the Soviet Union. 
There was no spinoff in the Soviet Union because there were no 
civilian successes there to spinn off.99 Analyses arriving at this 
conclusion have almost become a cottage industry in Moscow. loo 
The clear implication of all of them is-if the USSR wants to ensure 
its security, it must first take a detour through civilian informatics. 
34 
Prospects for influencing the trend 
toward space militarization 
In the early fall of l 987, when Soviet arms-control intentions were 
beginning to take shape, a prediction was published by this author 
that «in the not-too-distant future Moscow is likely to come 
forward with conventional proposals that Western governments 
cannot refuse.>> The analysis went along the lines reported here: that 
Gorbachev's arms-control approach was apparently an outgrowth 
of the 1983-84 debate over unilateral reductions; that Moscow 
would have to cut military expenditures anyway; and the danger 
was that the West would not recognize how strong its bargaining 
position really was. But another danger was also identified. The 
West had to remember why Moscow had gone in for arms control. 
It was evidently girding up its loins for the contest in space, and 
the U.S., having forced the USSR to burn its bridges to other 
options, would need to keep up its end of the competition. ID! When 
this paper was being briefed, a member of one audience asked why, 
if the USSR agrees to eliminate its advantages in the traditional 
spheres, Washington and Moscow could not then mutually 
renounce the militarization of space, with appropriate guarantees. 
This outcome, of course, is not to he ruled out. There are some 
who interpret Moscow's more relaxed position on the subject of SDI 
as the result of a conviction that the initiative is politically dead and 
will never be implemented. More likely, however, Moscow feels its 
concessions have earned it the right to expect U.S. restraint in 
deploying SDI. There is even some evidence that, given American 
restraint, mutual ABM deployments are preferable to mutual 
renunciations of such deployments.1o2 
The first hint of Soviet abandonment of a rejectionist stand 
appeared in an article co-authored by General-Major Yuriy Lebe-
dev, Deputy Chief of the general Staffs Treaty and Legal 
Directorate, and published in the Central Committee's political 
journal, The Communist, in September l 988. According to 
Lebedev, if there is no meeting of the minds over banning space 
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defense systems, then a negotiated agreement on limiting or 
reducing them is «inevitable.»IOJ 
The second item of evidence is a February 1989 article written 
by Ednan Agaev, a second secretary in the International 
Organizations Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
published in the Ministry's journal, International Affairs. According 
to Agaev, the 1972 ABM Treaty legitimized the concept of 
«Offensive deterrence,>> which is <<the quintessence of an offensive, 
i.e., an objectively aggressive, philosophy.>> As an <<alternative to 
mutual assured destruction>> he counterposed the concept of 
<<defensive deterrence,» founded on «powerful shields>> and 
shortened «Swords>> on both sides. By «powerful shields>> he meant 
ABM systems, without copying SDI. By shortened swords he meant 
a radical reduction in offensive warheads mainly by replacing 
MIRVed missiles with single warhead systems.I04 
Evidently this stand of opinion favours BMD because it will 
protect the Soviet Union against third powers and restore its unique 
standing in the international community along with America, rather 
than permitting it to sink in the growing sea of offensive nuclear 
powers. This theme was addressed by Aleksey Arbatov in another 
article in International Affairs the following month. The author 
said, in a passage lifted from context without shame:I06 
The I 00 defensive missiles {of the Moscow complex] allowed by the ABM 
Treaty are clear~)' insujficielllto protect against a deliberate strike by major 
forces of the U.S., Great Britain, and France. Protection against strikes by 
terrorists and other possible nuclear powers and against unsanctioned and 
accidental missile launches requires cover, even if only «thin,>_; for the entire 
tenitory of the country107 
That there is justification for taking this passage out of context is 
evident from the charge of General-Major Lyubinov that Arbatov's 
advocacy of «a 'thin' screen for the entire territory of the country ... 
would in fact mean repudiating the permanent ABM Treaty.>> It is 
curious that, even though, as Lyubimov notes, Arbatov's stance 
contradicts the official position of the Soviet government, the 
editors of International Affairs, an organ of the Foreign Ministry, 
refused to print Lyubinov's critique, and he had to be satisfied with 
publication in the military-political journal, Communist of the 
Armed Forces. I 07 
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Views similar to Arbatov's were subsequently presented more 
openly in Pravda by V.S. Etkin, Chief of the Applied Space Physics 
Department in the Academy of Sciences' Space Research Institute. 
Etkin noted that <<Space research, next after the thermonuclear 
problem, is the sphere of the most advanced science, where 
fundamental knowledge, technical progress, and defense come 
together. .. >> It is high time, in his view, that the U.S. and USSR 
resorted to cooperation in space, rather than leaving their 
competition unfettered. This is the case with <<space-based anti-
missile defense,>> the capabilities of which have been called into 
question, but only when it comes to a <<global>> conflict between the 
U.S. and USSR. 
But what if the cnnjliJ:t is not global? What if it is a matter of guarantees 
against accidental launches or, the main thing, against missile launches by 
extremist groups? Such a limited system, which would include both ground-
and .\pace-based positions for combating umnassed missile laullches, is 
ll'ithin the bounds of possible technical solwions. JOB 
Certainly all this amounts to something more than individual 
views gaining expression under glasnost'. It is too early to tell, how-
ever, whether it represents an acceptable trend of thinking among a 
portion of the Soviet elite or the first officially inspired efforts to 
accustom the public to a change of course. 
Soviet accommodation on strategic defense would complete the 
arms-control circle. Conventional and !heater-nuclear options 
already seem slated for crippling limitations; as matters now stand, 
the strategic sphere alone seems to remain a contested arena of the 
future. A BMD agreement, coupled with steps to <<shorten>> the 
nuclear swords of both sides, will not stop the contest but for a 
decade or so can soften its rigors and add a degree of predictability 
to Soviet and U.S. behaviour. 
37 
Notes 
!. According to Marshal Akhromeev during his visit to the U.S., the 
USSR Defense Council, chaired by Gorbachev, spent two years 
working out the new <<defensive>> military doctrine (Waiter Pincus, 
«Soviet Pledges Military Changes,>> Washington Post, 13 Jul I 988). 
2. For earlier Soviet usage of the word «sufficiency,» see Raymond L. 
Garthoff, «New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine,» Washington 
Quarterly, Summer 1989, pp. 131-139. 
3. D. T. Yazov, «The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact - a 
Doctrine for the Defense of Peace and Socialism,» Krasnaya zvezda, 
28 Jul 1987, p.2 
4. According to General-Lieutenant Petrenko, «The concepts of 
'attack' [napadenie] and 'offense' [nastuplenie] should be differen-
tiated ... The first is a political category, the second is from the 
sphere of the military art>> (V. Ya Petrenko, «<f you Are Arguing 
DoctrineS,>> Novae vremya, no 4 (22 Jan), 1988, p. 14. 
5. Sergey Akhromeev, «A Doctrine of Preventing War and Defending 
Peace and Socialism,» Problemy mira i sotsializma, December 1987, 
J6 P·- . 
6. Lobov's remarks were made on Soviet TV's Studio-9 program, 15 
October 1988, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(hereafter FBIS)', Daily Report: Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-88-201, 
18 October 1987, p.84. 
7. J. M. Me Connell, <<'Reasonable Sufficiency' in Soviet Conventional 
Arms-Control Strategy,« (Alexandria, Virginia, Center for Naval 
Analyses [CNA] no. 87-1918, I October 987), pp.6-8. 
R. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, «The Confrontation of General-
Purpose Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability,» 
Mirovava ekonomika in tnezhdunarodnye otnosheniva (hereafter 
MEiMO) no, !988, pp. 24-25. . . 
9. A Kokoshin, «The Development of Military Affairs and the 
Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments,>> ibid., 
no. I, 1988, pp 23-24; A. Kokoshin, «A A. Svechin;: On War and 
Policy,>> Mezhdunarodnaya zhiZfl' (hereafter MZh), no 10, 1988, 
p.l41; Colonel Vladimir Nazarenko, «A Concrete Step in the 
Policy of Reasonable Sufficiency for Defense,>> Voennyy veslllik 
(APN), December 1988, p.8. For a restatement of the old orthodox 
view of the primacy of the offense on the very eve of the 
promulgation of the new doctrine, see Colonel G. G. Lukava, «The 
Military-Theoretical Views of V.!. Lenin and Soviet Military 
Science,>> in General-Major A. S. Milovidov (ed)., Voenno-
38 
teoreticheskoe nas!edie V. l Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny 
(2nd ed., Moscow, 1987), p. 25 L 
10 Kokoshin and Larionov, op.cit., pp. 26-27. 
11. «A Doctrine for Preventing War,» Krasnaya zvezda, 23 June 1987, 
p.3. 
12. Clearcut backing for this version appears in Ministry of Defense D. 
T. Yazov's pamphlet, Na strazlze sotsializma i mira (Moscow, 1987), 
p.32. For uniformed political officers behind it, see Yu.Ya. Kirshin, 
V. M. Popov, and R. A. Saushkin, Politicheskoe soderzlzanie 
sovremennyklz voyn (Moscow), 1987), p. 242; Colonel P. Skoro-
denko, «Military Strategic Parity as a Factor in Preventing War,>> 
Kommunist voomzhennykh si~ no. 12 (June), 1988, p. 46. For 
civilians, see G. I. Demin and E. V. Zhukov, Doktrina zashclzity 
sotsializma i mira (Moscow, 1988), p.3 L 
13. See, e.g., Jgor Malashenko, «Security- Its Non-Military AspectS,>> 
MZI~ no. 12, 1988, p. 49; interview with General Yuriy Batenin, the 
Central Committee's military expert, by Kate Clark, Moming Star, 
(London), I 0 April 1989, p.6, reprinted in FBIS, Daily Repon: Soviet 
Union, (FBIS-SOV-89-072, 17 April 1989), p.3; Vitaliy Shlykov, 
<<Who Should Work Out Military Strategy?>> MZh, no 4, 1989, p. 
26. 
14. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, <<The Battle of Kursk in Light of 
Today's Defensive Doctrine,>> MEiMO, August 1987, pp. 32 ff. 
15. <<Rethinking Victory: An Interview with Andrey Kokoshin>> Detente 
(Leeds), no. 13, 17 November 1988, reprinted in FBIS, Dai(v Repon: 
Soviet Union (FBJS-SOV-88-238, 12 December 1988), p. 13. 
16. A. Kokoshin, <<The New Soviet Military Doctrine and Unilaterial 
Cuts of the USSR Armed Forces,>> Statement before the House 
Anned Sen•ices Commiuee, 10 March 1989, p.7. 
17. John J. Fialka, <<Soviet Switch,>> Wall Street JoumaL 25 April 1989, 
p.7; Jacques Isnard, <<Red Army in Throes of Restructuring,» Le 
Monde, 4 April 1989, tr. in FBIS, Daily Repon: Soviet Union (FBIS-
SOV-89-071, 14 April 1989), p. 6. 
18. General-Lieutenant Vladimir Serebryannikov, Deputy Comman-
dant of the Lenin Military-Policy Academy, <<Dilemmas and 
Priorities,» Novoe vremya, no 12. (17 March), 1989, pp. 16-17. 
19. <<The Defense Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States,>> Zolnierz 
wolnosci, 26 June 1989, p.4, tr. in FBJS, Daily Repon: Eastem 
Europe. (FBIS-EEU-89-124, 29 June 1989), pp. 46-47. In a July 
interview, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Lobov spoke only of 
defense and the counteroffensive (Versioniii) rather than the triad 
defense-counteroffense-offense typical of version II (<<Although the 
Threat Has Decreased>> Novae vremya, no. 29 [14 July], 1989 p.9). 
39 
20. Jon Conneli,Brian Moynahan, and James Adams, <<Army Cutback 
Eases,» London Sunday Times. 11 December 1988, p. 16. 
21. Michael Gordon, <<Soviets Limiting Quick Strike Ability,>> New 
York Times, 26 January 1989, pp. 6, 10. 
22. V. V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, and A. V. Kortunov, «On 
Reasonable Sutficiency,» SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya 
(hereafter SShA), pp. 17-18. 
23. See the report by the House Armed Services Committee's Defense 
Policy Panel, Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet 
Military, 13 September 1988, p. 13. 
24. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The State of Westem Research Oil Soviet 
Milital}' Strategy and Policy (Santa Monica, RAND, 1984), pp. 38-
40; see also Stephen Meyer, «Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to 
Nuclear War,» in Graham T. Allison,Albert Carnesale, and Joseph 
Nye (eds.), Hawks, Dove'; and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding 
Nuclear War(New York, W. W. Norton, 1985), 16Y. Others have 
tried to counter this view of the instituchiki by showing some of the 
mistaken assumptions behind it: Raymond Garthoff, «BMD and 
East- West Relations,>> in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz 
(eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C., Brookings, 
1984), 310-311; Jerry F. Hough, «Soviet Decision-Making on 
Defense,» Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist'; August 1985, pp. 86-87. 
25. Interview with Shmelev by Vladimir Voyna, «Private Conversation: 
When Hope Appeared,» Nedelya, no. 39, 1988, p.21. 
26. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, «Dismantling in Favor of the 
Defense,» Novae vremya, no.! 0 (3 March), 1984, p. 19. 
27. «On the Military Doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw 
Pact,» lzvestiya, 31 May 1987, p.2. 
28. Kokoshin and Larionov, MEiMO, no 6, 1988, op. cit., p.28. 
29. Vladimir Nazarenko, «The Contours of an Agreement,» Novae 
vremya, no. 14 (I April), 1989, p.IO. 
30. D. T. Yazov, Pravda, 27 July 1987, p.5. 
31. Vitaliy Zhurkin, Sergey Karaganov, and Andrey Kortunov, 
«Reasonable Sufficiency, or How to Break the Vicious Circle,» 
Novae vremya, no 40. (2 October), 1987, p. 15; Aleksey Arbatov, 
«On Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency,» MZh September 1988, p. 
91; A. Arbatov, «How Much Defense is Enough,» MZh, March 
1989, pp. 36, 43-44. 
32. V. Larionov, Sovetskaya voennaya doktrina· istoriya i sovremennost' 
(paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Military Doctrine in 
an Era of Change, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, V a., 25-27 
May 1989), pp. 5-6. 
40 
33. See Suzanne M. Crow, «The Current Soviet Debate on a Cadre-
Militia System,» lane's Soviet Intelligence Review. August 1989, 
pp.366ff. 
34. V. Larionov, Sovetskaya voennaya doktrina: istoriya i sovremen-
nost', op. cit., p. 4. 
35. Arbatov, MZh, March 1989, p. 44 
36. Interview with General of the Army M.A. Moiseev, «The Soldiers 
Take Off Their Greatcoats,» Pravite/' stvennyy vestnik, no. 9 (May), 
1989, p. 5; D. T. Yazov, «On the Cutting Edge of Perestroyka,» 
Krasnaya zvezda, 7 March 1989, p.2. 
37. S.F. Akhromeev, «The Army and Perestroyka,» Sovetskaya Rossiya, 
14 January 1989, p. 3; Interview with V. N. Lobov, «and Only the 
Truth Will Do,» Izvestiya, 9 May 1989, p.3; !.M. Tretyak's 
statement in a round-table discussion, <<Veterans and Perestroyka,)) 
Krasnaya zvezda, 4 March 1989, p.2 
38. Interview with V. L. Lapygin by S. Taranov, «Giasnost' and State 
Security,» Izvestiya, 27 June I 989, p. 2. 
39. For a comparison of Soviet approaches, see Stephen Shentield's 
paper, «Rival Soviet Schemes for Minimum Nuclear Deten·ence,« 
prepared for the Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown 
University, July 1988. 
40. Colonel Vladimir Nazarenko, Voennvv vestnik (APN), December 
1988, p.7. 
41. A. G. Arbatov, MZh, September 1988, pp. 87-88 
42. A. Podberezkin, «Captive to the Myth of Military Superiority,» 
Kommunist voomzhennykh si/, no 11 (June), 1988, p. 92. 
43. See his remarks on the Moscow Studio-9 TV program, tr. in FBIS, 
Arms Comrol (JPRS-TAC-87-045, 2 July 1987), p. 57. 
44. A. A: Kokoshin, «The Reduction of Nuclear Armaments and 
Strategic Stability,>• SShA, No.2, 1988, pp.4-5. 
45. Lednev, <ds a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse Possible?>> SShA, 
no, 7, 1989, p.6. 
46. A. Arbatov, «Military Doctrines,» in the Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations Work, Disarmament and 
Security: I 987 Yearbook (Moscow, Novosti, 1988), p. 204. 
47. J. M. McConnell, «Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of 
Military Development,» World Politics, April 1985, pp. 330-331. 
48. J.M. McConnell, "A Counterforce Role for the Soviet Typhoon 
Nuclear-Powered Missile Submarine?» Mmine-Rundschau, January 
1983, pp. 11-12. 
49. J. M. McConnell, The Soviet Shifi Toward and Away From Nuclear 
War- Waging (Alexandria, Virginia, CNA no. 84-0690, 1985), p. 
129. 
41 
50. N. P. V'yunenko, B.N. Makeev, and V. D. Skugarev, Voenno-
Morskoy FloL" rot: perspektivy razvitiya, ispolzovanie (Moscow, 198-
8), pp. 36-38. 
51. Ibid., p. 35-41. Credit for editing the work and writing the preface 
was given to the late ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy S. 
G. Gorshkov. 
52. A. G. Savel'ev, «War Prevention and Deterrence; Warsaw Pact and 
NATO Approaches,» MEiMO, no 6, 1989, p. 23. 
53. J. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, 
and Their Relation to Policy,» in M. MccGwire and J. McConnell 
(eds.), Soviet Naval Influence (New York, Praeger, 1977), pp. 570-
573. 
54. V'yunenko, Makeev and Skugarev, op.cit., pp. 28-29,37-38,221-
224, 229, 231. 
55. v. Etkin, «Away from Secrecy Toward Trust,>> Pravda, 20 July 
1989, p.5. 
56. Garthoff, Washington Quanerly, Summer 1988, pp. 148-149; 
Robert Legvold, «Gorbachev's New Approach to Conventional 
Arms Control,>> Harriman Institute Foram, Vol.!, no. I (January), 
1988, p.7. 
57. Condoleeza Rice, «Gorbachev and the Military; A Revolution in 
Security Policy, Too?>> ibid. VOI.II, no. 4 (April), 1989, p.2. 
58. Gerhard Wettig, «'New Thinking' on Security and East- West 
RelationS,>> Problems ofCommunLwn, March-April 1988, p. 6.; Dale 
L. Herspring, «The Soviet High Command Looks at GorbacheV,>> in 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 235, Part 
I, Spring 1989, pp. 59-60. 
59. See J. E. Mroz, «Introduction: Perestroyka and Economic 
Security,>> in Abel Aganbegyan and Timor Timofeev, The New 
Stage of Perestroyka (New York, Institute for East-West Security 
Studies, 1988), pp. 9-10, 16. 
60. «Academician Interviewed on Perestroyka,>> Nihon Keizai Shim-
bun, 29 February 1988, p.l, tr. in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 
Annex (FBIS-SOV-88-046, 9 March 1988), p. 10; N. Shmelev, 
«The Economy and Common Sense,» Znamya, no 7 (July), 1988, 
tr. in FBIS, JPRS Repon: Soviet Union (JPRS-UEA-88-037, 4 
October 1988), p.28. 
61. E. Kuznetsov and F. Shirokov, «Science-Intensive Production and 
the Conversion of Defense Industry,>> Kommunist, no 10 (July), 
1988,p.15. 
62. A Gavryushkin and N. Sokov, «On the Straightforwardness of the 
Arms Race,>> MZh, no 8, 1988, p. 84. 
42 
63. E. A. Shevardnadze, «The XIX All-Union Conference of the CPSU: 
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy,>> MZh September 1988, p.19. 
64. See Wiliam E. Odom, «Choice and Change in Soviet Politics,» 
Problems of Communism, May-June 1983, p. 11. 
65. Demon and Zhukov, op. cit., p. 45. 
66. Deputy Foreign Ministers V. P. Karpov and V. F. Petrovskiy sit on 
the Council of the journal, as well as Academicians E. P. Velikhov 
and R.Z. Sagdeev. 
67. A.l.lzyumov and A. V. Kortunov, «The Soviet Union in a Changing 
World,» MZh, July 1988, pp. 53-77. 
68. Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
69. !bid, pp. 61-62. 
70. Ibid., pp.63. 
71. Quoted by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten 
Peace, March !918 (London, Macmillan, 1956), p.304. 
72. See, e.g., A. Akhtamzyan and N. Kapchenko, «The Turning Point 
(Brest in Historical Retrospective), «MZh, no 3, 1988, pp. 28ff L. 
Lyubinov, «New Thinking and Soviet-American Relations,» MEiM 
no.3, 1988, pp. 3ff. 
73. V. M. Berezhkov, <<Before a New Summit, «SShA May 1988, P. 4; 
S. Blagovolin, «Strength and Weakness in Military Power,» 
/zvestiya, 18 November 1988, p.5 
74. See Gorbachev's speech to the Congress of People's Deputies held 
in the Kremlin, May-June 1989, <<On Major Directions of the 
USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy,» Documents and Materials. 
Moscow, Novosti, 1989), p. 36. 
75. lzyumov and Kortunov, op. cit., p. 62. 
76. Daniil Procktor, «On Policy, Clausewitz, and Victory in Nuclear 
War.» MZh. no 4, 1989, p. 83. 
77. A. G. Arbatov, «Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: In Seach of a New 
Basis for European Security.» (paper presented at the Conference 
on Rethinking European Security, Florence, Italy, September 
1988), p.4. 
78. Robert L. Kel!ogg, «Modeling Soviet Modernization: An Economy 
in Transition,» Soviet Economy, Vol. IV, no. I (January-March), 
1988, pp. 48, 55. 
79. V.F. Petrovskiy in Obshchestvennye nauki, no 3, !988, tr. in FBIS, 
Soviet Union: Military Affairs (JPRS-UMA-88-026, 7 November 
!988), p.IO. 
80. Quoted in V. S. Nechaev, Reshayushchiy istoc/mik boemy moshchi 
(Moscow, !987),p.55 
81. J. M. Me Connell, «SDI, The Soviet Investment Debate and Soviet 
Military Policy,>> Strategic Review, Winter 1988, pp. 47ff. 
43 
82. See General-Major Boris Surikov, «Stellar Illusions,» MEiMO no. 
12, 1988, p. 78; William J. Broad, Star Warri01o (New York, Simon 
and Schusler), p. 121. 
83. «A Conference of Military Heads in the Kremlin,» Krasnava 
zvezda, 28 October 1982, p. l. • 
84. Moscow TASS broadcast in English, 1553 GMT, 4 October 1982, 
published in FBIS, USSR lntemational Affairs, 5 October 1982, Vol. 
Ill, pp. AA4·AA5. 
85. D. F. Ustinov, «Strengthening the Defense Capabilities oflhe Soviet 
Union- A Cause of the Party, a Cause of the Whole People,» Tap 
Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, no ll, 1982, pp. 11·12. I am indebted to 
Hung Nguyen for this reference. 
86. Compare the passage cited in the previous footnote with Ustinov's 
pamphlet, Borot:o;ya za mir, ukreplyat' oborono-sposolmost' (Mos-
cow, 1983 ), p. 5. 
87. ••A Political Declaration by the Member Stales of the Warsaw 
Pact,» Pravda, 7 January 1983, p.l; see also the Pravda editorial of 
25 January 1983, p.l, «There Is No Task More Important.« 
88. Robert E. Leggett, «Soviet Investment Policy: The Key to 
Gorbachev's Program for Revitalizing the Soviet Economy,» in J. P. 
Hardt and R.zF. Kaufman (eds.), Gorbachel•'s Economic Plan, Studv 
Papers submitted to the Joim Economic Committee, Congress of tlie 
United States (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1987), Vol. I, pp. 236, 241. 
89. Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSR, Narodnoe Klwzyaystvo 
SSSR v 1984 godu: statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (Moscow, 19 85 ), p. 
175. 
90. Interview with Abel Aganbygyan, «The New Economic Mecha-
nism -New Management Methods,» Tntd (Sofia), 9 March 1988, p. 
l, tr. in FBIS, Daily Repol1: Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-RR-048, 11 
March 1988). 
91. Bohdan Nahaylo, «<nterview with Tat'yana Zaslavskaya,» Radio 
Libe11y Research RL 365187, 15 September 1987, pp. 14.18. 
92. Quoted by Ronald Amann, «implications of Economic Reform,» in 
H. H. Hohmann, Alec Nave, and Heinrich Vogel (eds:), Economics 
and Politics in the USSR· Problems of lmerdependence (Boulder and 
London, Westview Press, 1986), p. 133. 
93. McConnell in Strategic R£~'iew, op.cit., pp. 57-58. 
94. M.zl. Gerasev and A. A. Konovalov, «Looking for a Space 
Doctrine,» SShA, no. 5. 1988, p. 20. 
95. J.M. McConnell, The Sol'iet Shift Toward and A way From Nuclear 
War Waging (Alexandria, Virginia, CNA 84-0690, 1985), pp. 57, 
68. 82, 96-97. 
44 
96. F. Burlatskiy, «The Technological Revolution and the Ethics of 
Robots,» Literatumaya gazeta. 31 October !9R4, p. 14. 
97. Matthew Evangelista, «Economic Reform and Military Technology 
in Soviet Security Policy,» Harriman Institute Fomm, Vol. II, no. 1 
(January), 1989, pp. 2-3; Richard F. Kaufman, «Economic Reform 
and the Soviet Military,» Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988, 
pp.2o4-205; N. P. Michaud, S. 0. Maddalena and M.J. Barry, 
«Commentary,>> in J. Hardt and R. Kaufman (eds.) op. cit., Voi.I, pp. 
485, 488. 
98. «Brilliant Pebbles Missile Defense Concept Advocated by Liver-
more Scientist,» Aviation Week and Space Tec/malogy, 13 June 
!988, p. 66. 
99. See the unsigned report on the conference, <<Problems of 
Converting War Production,» SShA, no. 3, 1989, pp. 91-92. 
I 00. Vitaliy Shlykov, <<Who Should Work Out Military Strategy?» MZh, 
no 4, 1989, p. 24; Sergey B1agovolin, <<Military Strength - How 
Much, What Kind, For What?» MEiMO, no 8, 1989, pp. 14-15; E. 
Kuznetsov and F. Shirokov in Kommunist, no. 10, 1989, p. 16. 
10 I. Computer Equipment Must Be at the Level of Modern Require-
ments,» Pravda, 31 January 1989, p. 2. 
102. McConnell, <<'Reasonable Sufficiency' in Soviet Conventional 
Arms-Control Strategy,» op.cit. 
I 03. See the forthcoming paper of my colleague Hung Nguyen, 
tentatively entitled, <<A Potential Soviet Compromise on BMD.» 
104. Yu Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, <<Military Doctrine and 
International Security,» Kommunist, no 13 (September), 1988 p. 
114. 
105. E. Agaev, <<A New Model of Strategic Stability,» MZh. no 2, 1989, 
pp. 107-111. 
106. It is a standard Soviet communication technique to imbed the most 
interesting revelations in a seemingly antithetical context. 
107. A. Arbatov, <<How Much Defense is Enough,» MZh, no 3, 1989, p. 
42. 
108. Yu. Lyubimov, <<On Sufficiency of Defense and Deficiency of 
Competence,» Kommunist voamzhennykh si4 no. 16 (August), 
1989, pp. 21, 26. 
109. V. Etkin in Pravda, 20 July 1989, p. 5. 
45 
Publikasjoner fra IFS 
* lnstitutt for forsvarsstudier - tidligere Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter -
bar utgitt clrb~kene FORSVARSSTUDIER- Defence Studies. 
* SkrijiSerien FORSVARSSTUDIER, som utgis fra 1987. 
Begge serier kan bestilles fra 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier 
Tollbugaten 10 
0152 OSLO I 
Tlf.: 02-40 31 05 
Tidligere utkommet: 
0. Riste (red.): FORSVARSSTUDIER - Defence Studies. Arbok for For.;vars· 
historisk forskningssentcr- Forsvarets hogskole 1981. (Tan~m-Norli 1982): 
0. Riste: 
0. Riste: 
0. Riste: 
K. E. Eriksen: 
R. Tamnes: 
0 Riste: 
D. C. Pugh: 
The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation: 
Norway's <<Atlantic Policyn 1940--1945. 
Svalbard-krisen 1944-1945. 
Functional Ties - A Semi-Alliance'? Military Coopera-
tion in North· West Europe 1944-1947. 
Storbritannia og basepolitikken i Norden 1945-1947. 
Den norske holdningen til atomfrie saner i Sentral-
Europa 1957-1965. 
Politics in the Armed Forces: A Contemporary Prob-
lem in Historical Perspective. 
The Armed Forces and Alta: Some Tentative Reflec-
tions on Civil-Military Rdations. 
R. Tamnes (red.): FORSVARSSTUDIER - Defence Studies. Arbok for For-
svar.;histotisk forskningssenter- Forsvarets hogskole 1981. (Tanum·Norli 1983): 
R. Tamnes: 
0. Riste: 
R. Tamnes: 
0. Wicken: 
0. Riste: 
46 
Den norske holdningen til en nordisk atomvApenfri 
sone 1958-1983. 
Ein ide og ein myte: Roosevelts friharnnstanke for Nord-
Norge. 
NATOs og Norges reaksjon pa Tsjekkoslovakia-kriscn 
1968. 
Ny teknologi og heyere priser. 
The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Norway: A His-
torical Perspective. 
, 
FORS V ARSSTUDIER 
lames McConnell 
INSTITUTT FOR 
FORSV ARSSTUDIER 
7/1990 
DlJ@ 

